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Vanessa Di Feo*

You’ve Got to Have (Good) Faith:
Good Faith’s Trajectory in Anglo-Canadian
Contract Law Post-Wastech and the
Potential for a Duty to Renegotiate

This paper argues that the organizing principle of good faith should be judicially
developed to include a duty to renegotiate in situations of hardship. It looks to
the French Civil Code and the UNIDROIT Principles for guidance, in addition to
Canadian law’s receptibility to an incrementally expanded principle of good faith.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada rejected hardship in the 2018 case of
Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp v Hydro-Québec, it did not forever close the door
to this doctrine in Québec in situations of true financial peril. Given the “judicial
dialogue” between Québec civil law obligations and Anglo-Canadian contract
law, not to mention the Supreme Court of Canada’s increasingly expansionist
approach, this illustrates a slight opening for the recognition of hardship in AngloCanadian contract law as well. Prior to proposing a test for the duty to renegotiate,
the paper assesses the trajectory of good faith in Québec civil law and AngloCanadian contract law, in particular the duty to exercise a discretion in good faith
and abuse of contractual rights. Given the law’s trend in an increasingly moral and
interventionist direction, this paper argues that the time is ripe to allow for a duty to
renegotiate in good faith where parties experience contractual hardship.

Dans le présent article, nous soutenons que le principe organisateur de la bonne foi
devrait être développé judiciairement pour inclure une obligation de renégociation
dans les situations de « hardship ». Il s’inspire du Code civil français et des
principes d’UNIDROIT, ainsi que de la réceptivité du droit canadien à un principe
de bonne foi progressivement élargi. Bien que la Cour suprême du Canada ait
rejeté le « hardship » dans l’affaire Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp c. HydroQuébec en 2018, elle n’a pas fermé à jamais la porte à cette doctrine au Québec
dans les situations de véritable péril financier. Compte tenu du « dialogue judiciaire
» entre les obligations de droit civil québécois et le droit des contrats anglocanadien, sans compter l’approche de plus en plus expansionniste de la Cour
suprême du Canada, cela illustre une légère ouverture pour la reconnaissance du
« hardship » en droit des contrats anglo-canadien également. Avant de proposer
un test pour l’obligation de renégocier, nous examinons la trajectoire de la bonne
foi en droit civil québécois et en droit des contrats anglo-canadien, en particulier
l’obligation d’exercer un pouvoir discrétionnaire de bonne foi et l’abus des droits
contractuels. Compte tenu de la tendance du droit à s’orienter de plus en plus
vers la morale et l’interventionnisme, le présent article soutient que le moment est
venu de permettre une obligation de renégociation de bonne foi lorsque les parties
éprouvent des difficultés contractuelles.

*
BA, JD, BCL, LLM. I would like to thank all those who provided feedback on this article, in
particular Professor Stephen Waddams, for his invaluable guidance, and the anonymous reviewers and
editors of the Dalhousie Law Journal for their constructive comments. All beliefs presented and any
errors in this article are my own.
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“Arguably, the world of contracts has never suffered such an
unforeseeable, global, intense interference. Extraordinary situations
require extraordinary solutions, and there is a global need to ensure the
economic value enshrined in commercial exchanges is not destroyed.”1
–UNIDROIT Secretariat

Introduction2
From its inception, Covid-19 has devastated commerce, impacting
contracting parties’ ability to fulfill their obligations. Although contract
law has traditionally been cautious about intervening to undermine the
parties’ control over their agreements, Covid-19 has renewed conversations
about potential legal recourses in response to supervening events. Many
of these discussions have focused on the doctrine of frustration and force
majeure clauses.3 Yet, as they are understood in Anglo-Canadian contract
law, these concepts are insufficient to address hardship resulting from
Covid-19.4 The lack of flexibility in the law illustrates the need to develop
another mechanism to respond to Covid-19’s impacts.
The legal literature and jurisprudence seldom ponder the relationship
between good faith and frustration. This paper aims to fill this scholarly
gap by arguing that the organizing principle of good faith ought to be
incrementally expanded to include a common law duty to renegotiate in
1.
UNIDROIT Secretariat, “UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and
the Covid-19 Health Crisis” (2020) at para 53, online (pdf): UNIDROIT <www.unidroit.org/english/
news/2020/200721-principles-covid19-note/note-e.pdf> [perma.cc/L5XD-6QCQ].
2.
A brief note on language: the author uses the term “Anglo-Canadian contract law” to refer
to the laws of the common law Canadian provinces. “Hardship” refers to the private law rule that
some civilian jurisdictions recognize where an unforeseen event of a fundamental character, beyond
the parties’ control, renders contractual performance excessively onerous: Clive Schmitthof,
“Hardship and Intervener Clauses” (1980) J Bus L 82 at 85. This term was used interchangeably with
“unforeseeability” and “imprévision” in Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp v HydroQuébec, 2018 SCC
46 at paras 6, 88 [Churchill Falls SCC]. Generally, the basis for relief in situations of hardship is
informed by good faith.
3.
See e.g. Klaus P Berger & Daniel Behn, “Force Majeure and Hardship in the Age of Corona:
A Historical and Comparative Study” (2020) 6:4 McGill J Dispute Resolution 76 at 79; Michael
Douglas & John Eldridge, “Coronavirus and the Law of Obligations” [2020] 3 UNSWLJ Forum 1;
Peter J Wiazowski & Trevor Zeyl, “Contract Performance in a Coronavirus World: Force Majeure
Clauses and the Doctrine of Frustration” (18 March 2020), online (blog): Norton Rose Fulbright LLP
<www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-ca/knowledge/publications/844d7cf4/contract-performance-in-acoronavirus-world-force-majeure-clauses-and-the-doctrine-of-frustration> [perma.cc/3759-PBGC].
4.
The Supreme Court of Canada has set a high threshold for frustration. See e.g. Naylor Group
Inc v Ellis-Don Construction Ltd, 2001 SCC 58 at para 53 [Naylor Group] and Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co
v Eakins Construction Ltd, [1960] SCR 361 at 368, 22 DLR (2d) 465 [Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co]. With
regard to force majeure clauses, there is no explicit rule that a contract with such a clause cannot be
frustrated: Petrogas Processing Ltd v Westcoast Transmission Co, [1988] 4 WWR 699 at para 79, 59
Alta LR (2d) 118 (Alta QB).
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the face of hardship. The organizing principle is a flexible tool that has the
potential to resolve legal inconsistencies.5 Seeing that the current duties
that flow from this principle are inadequate to assist contracting parties
experiencing hardship, as this article later explains, the courts ought to
build off of this flexibility to expand the organizing principle. Imposing
a corresponding duty to renegotiate would allow for flexibility where
frustration is too rigid to respond. Where renegotiations fail and the parties
request judicial intervention, this paper proposes that the courts should
resort to good faith as a residual power “to modify highly unreasonable
contracts even where…they are clear and unambiguous.”6
This paper is divided into three main parts. First, it explains that there is
a gap in the law of frustration. Second, it illustrates how Article 1195 of the
Code civil des français (CCF) and Articles 6.2.1–6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT) address
contractual hardship. Third, it establishes that Anglo-Canadian contract law
is moving in a direction that prioritizes reasonable contracting behaviour
and approves of the courts’ powers to provide relief where contracts are
unfair. Although tensions in the law persist, this paper submits that AngloCanadian contract law possesses the flexibility to one day include a duty
to renegotiate in good faith to allow for fairness absent recourse under the
doctrine of frustration. Ultimately, this paper highlights a key question
in contract law: “the extent to which enforcement will be withheld of
contracts that are very burdensome, or highly unreasonable”7 but do not
amount to contracts that have been frustrated.
I. Frustration as an inadequate solution to changed circumstances
The doctrine of frustration’s inadequacy to respond to hardship buttresses
the argument that good faith should be developed to allow parties to
renegotiate. While there is a rich history involving the doctrine of
frustration—“from a theory based on implied terms into an open recognition
that sanctity of contract must yield…to countervailing considerations of
justice”8—this paper focuses on Anglo-Canadian contract law’s modern
5.
Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 at para 92 [Bhasin].
6.
Stephen Waddams, “Good Faith in the Supreme Court of Canada” in Michael Furmston, The
Future of the Law of Contract, 1st ed, (Milton: Taylor and Francis, 2020) 28 at 47 [Waddams, “Good
Faith”].
7.
Stephen Waddams, Sanctity of Contracts in a Secular Age: Equity, Fairness and Enrichment
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) at vii [Waddams, “Sanctity of Contracts”].
8.
Ibid at 2. It is important to also note that Anglo-Canadian contract law’s conception of frustration
has been heavily influenced by English contract law, which has undergone a significant evolution from
absolute loyalty to contractual terms to implied terms to the modern-day concept of frustration. For
more information, see: Paradine v Jane, [1647] EWHC KB J5, 82 ER 897 ; Taylor v Caldwell, [1863]
EWHC QB J1; Krell v Henry, [1903] 2 KB 740, [1900–1903] All ER 20 (CA); John D McCamus,
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stance for the sake of brevity. Anglo-Canadian contract law sets a very high
threshold for frustration,9 and does not accept that hardship constitutes
a frustrating event (however, scholars have argued that the two are not
mutually exclusive).10
Anglo-Canadian contract law has embraced Lord Radcliffe’s approach
of the “radical change” in the nature of the obligation, as enunciated in
Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council.11 In Davis, a
contractor was hired to build 78 houses for £92,424 over the course of 8
months.12 Due to labor shortages, the contract took 22 months to complete
and the costs to build each house rose to £115, 233.13 The court denied the
contractor’s claim for frustration, seeing that the turn of events was not
unforeseeable.14 Lord Radcliffe stated the test as follows:
It is not hardship or inconvenience or material loss itself which calls the
principle of frustration into play. There must be as well such a change
in the significance of the obligation that the thing undertaken would if
performed, be a [radically] different thing from that contracted for.15

The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) has affirmed this test in the
seminal cases of Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co16 and Naylor Group.17 Thus, not
only must the supervening event render the obligation radically different,
but hardship is insufficient to ground relief in Anglo-Canadian contract
law.
As Professor John McCamus has observed, the doctrine of frustration
raises legal tensions:

The Law of Contracts, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at ch 14; Gerald HL Fridman, The Law
of Contract in Canada, 6th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at ch 17; Stephen Waddams, “Mistake in
Assumptions” (2014) 51:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 749.
9.
Professor John McCamus has distinguished three standard categories for the doctrine of
frustration: (1) the frustrating event has rendered performance impossible; (2) performance remains
possible but the purpose underlying the contract has been undermined; and (3) temporary impossibility:
McCamus, supra note 8 at 606-612.
10. Ibid at 566; Larry A Di Matteo, “Contractual Excuse Under the CISG: Impediment, Hardship,
and the Excuse Doctrines” (2015) 27:1 Pace Intl L Rev 258 at 263.
11. Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council, [1956] 2 All ER 145, [1956] AC 696
(HL (Eng)) [Davis cited to All ER].
12. Ibid at para 700.
13. Ibid at paras 700-701.
14. Lord Radcliffe elaborated that “the possibility of enough labour and materials not being available
was before their eyes and could have been the subject of special contractual stipulation. It was not
made so. The other thing is that, though timely completion was no doubt important to both sides, it is
not right to treat the possibility of delay as having the same significance for each:” ibid at para 731.
15. Ibid at para 729.
16. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co, supra note 4.
17. Naylor Group, supra note 4.
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[…] The frustration doctrine must find an appropriate balance between
the inclination to hold people to their bargains, notwithstanding the
fact that the bargain has become unexpectedly less attractive to them
and, on the other hand, an inclination to relieve the parties from their
bargains where a refusal to do so appears unjust and may result in
the unjust enrichment of the other party.18

Given these tensions, judges have been cautious and confined the doctrine
of frustration to rare circumstances.19 This narrow approach—which
bears similarities to Québec’s20—supports the argument that there is a
gap in the law pertaining to changed circumstances, and that it would be
appropriate to develop good faith to assist parties facing hardship arising
from extenuating circumstances (such as the Covid-19 pandemic).
1. The relationship between good faith and frustration: Klewchuk v
Switzer21
Generally, there is very little case law that addresses the relationship
between frustration and good faith. Klewchuk offers a rare example. The
impugned contract was a long-term agreement whereby Switzer rented his
casino to charities looking to host events and Klewchuk provided them
with equipment and employees.22 The charities paid the parties directly;
however, seven years after the contract was formed, Alberta amended the
Casino Terms & Conditions and Operating Guidelines.23 This amendment
affected the contract’s payment and registration methods, so the parties
decided to renegotiate their agreement.24 When Klewchuck experienced
18. McCamus, supra note 8 at 600.
19. Michael P Theroux & April D Grosse, “Force Majeure in Canadian Law” (2011) 49:2 Alta L Rev
397 at 400.
20. In Québec, changed circumstances will not be sufficient to overturn contractual terms, unless
they cause a substantial failure of performance: Canada Starch Co c Gill & Duffus (Canada) Ltd,
[1990] RL 602, 23 ACWS (3d) 986 CA Qc). The rules governing “force majeure” (referring to a
superior force rather than actual force majeure clauses) is set out under Article 1470 of the CCQ.
To constitute force majeure in Québec, an event must be both unforeseeable and irresistible. The
jurisprudence has defined unforeseeability as meaning that the party owing the obligation could
not foresee or reasonably be expected to foresee the supervening event. See e.g. Bénard v Hingston
(1917), 56 SCR 17 at 18-19, 39 DLR 137; Groupe CGU Canada ltée c Ste-Marie de Beauce (Ville
de), 2006 QCCS 2899 at para 126. To be considered irresistible, the event must be of such a nature
that it would be impossible for the disadvantaged party to take reasonable measures to avoid the event.
See e.g. Québec Métal Recyclé (FNF) Inc c Transnat Express Inc, [2005] JQ no 17323 at paras 16, 31
(CS Qc), EYB 2005-98179; Derouin c Legault, 2010 QCCQ 10001 at para 51. See also Jean Pineau,
Danielle Burman & Serge Gaudet, Théorie des Obligations, 4th ed (Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 2001)
at 802-803; Marel Katsivela, “Canadian Contract and Tort Law: The Concept of Force Majeure in
Québec and its Common Law Equivalent” (2011) 90:1 Can Bar Rev 69 at 70.
21. Klewchuk v Switzer, 2003 ABCA 187 [Klewchuk].
22. Ibid at para 3-4.
23. Ibid at para 7.
24. Ibid at para 9.
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financial distress, however, the renegotiations failed.25 In response,
Switzer notified Klewchuk and the Gaming Commission that the contract
was frustrated and he attempted to assume Klewchuk’s portion of the
business.26 Klewchuk claimed that Switzer’s actions were in bad faith.27
Although Klewchuk won at trial, the Alberta Court of Appeal allowed
the appeal in part.28 Moore J found that the supervening legislation frustrated
the contract.29 Further, good faith required the parties to negotiate, but not
to reach any formal agreement.30 Given that the parties had nearly reached
a new agreement, and that Switzer had evidently made good faith efforts
to negotiate, Moore J found that Switzer did not breach his duty of good
faith.31
Klewchuk indicates that, if the parties to a frustrated contract decide to
renegotiate their agreement on their own accord, then they must do so in
good faith. In her paper on the impacts of Covid-19 on commercial leasing,
Ms. Meg Heesaker construed the finding in Klewchuk as concerning a
“discretionary power which arose from ‘the long-standing business
arrangement carried on by the two parties,’32 their ‘original agreement
and […] expectation […] that their exclusive arrangement would continue
for their mutual benefit.’”33 Given that so few Canadian cases address the
intersection between good faith and frustration, a novel duty to renegotiate
would serve as a useful addition to Anglo-Canadian contract law.
II. Assessing the duty to renegotiate in situations of hardship outside of
Canada
Brown J has written that Anglo-Canadian contract law should only look to
foreign jurisdictions to fill “gaps” in the law.34 The doctrine of frustration
creates one such “gap.” In response, Anglo-Canadian contract law should
look to Article 1195 of the CCF and Articles 6.2.1–6.2.3 of UNIDROIT to
incrementally advance good faith to include a duty to renegotiate.

25. Ibid at para 10.
26. Ibid at paras 11-12.
27. Ibid at para 13.
28. Ibid at para 1.
29. Ibid at para 21.
30. Ibid at para 39.
31. Ibid.
32. Meg Heesaker, “Covid-19 & Commercial Leases: Rethinking Frustration and Contractual
Discharge in the Canadian Common Law” (2021) at 39 [unpublished, archived at SSRN], DOI:
<10.2139/ssrn.3801951>.
33. Ibid.
34. CM Callow Inc v Zollinger, 2020 SCC 45 at paras 123, 171 [Callow].
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1. Article 1195 of the French Civil Code
In 2016, French law formally recognized the doctrine of hardship.35 In
particular, Article 1195 stipulates as follows:
If a change of circumstances that was unforeseeable at the time of the
conclusion of the contract renders performance excessively onerous for a
party who had not accepted the risk of such a change, that party may ask
the other contracting party to renegotiate the contract. The first party must
continue to perform his obligations during renegotiation. In the case of
refusal or the failure of renegotiations, the parties may agree to terminate
the contract from the date and on the conditions which they determine, or
by a common agreement ask the court to set about its adaptation. In the
absence of an agreement within a reasonable time, the court may, on the
request of a party, revise the contract or put an end to it, from a date and
subject to such conditions as it shall determine.36

French practitioners have noted that hardship is intended to play a
preventive role, since the risk of judicial revision encourages the parties to
renegotiate a mutually beneficial bargain.37
It is necessary to emphasize two features of Article 1195. First,
contracting parties must face an extreme and unforeseeable increase in
performance costs or decrease of the benefits they expected to derive
from the other side’s performance.38 In relation to Covid-19, this task
will be increasingly challenging as the world learns more about the virus
35. Prior to the Ordonnance no 2016-131 of 10 February 2016, which came into force on 1 October
2016, French law explicitly rejected hardship. This rejection can be traced back to 1876, in the seminal
Cour de Cassation case of Cass civ 1re, 6 March 1876, Canal de Craponne, [1876] D 193 [Canal de
Craponne]. In Canal de Craponne, France’s highest court refused to adapt a maintenance fee for a
canal. Rather, it upheld the binding force of contracts, in accordance with Article 1134 of the Code
Napoléon of 1804. The court emphasized that, even though the fee required an adaptation (it had
been agreed upon in 1567), it was not its place to modify a contractual provision because there was
no legislative provision that allowed it to do so: 197. The Court was also concerned that modifying
the contract would undermine contractual stability and impinge upon the parties’ freedom of contract.
For hundreds of years, this case led the French courts to jealously protect the absolute nature of
contracts and the parties’ autonomous wills, with the exception of administrative law cases. For more
information, see Berger & Behn, supra note 3; Pierre Bienvenu, “A Comparative Look at Good Faith
and Changed Circumstances, Hardship and More” (September 2019), online: Norton Rose Fulbright
LLP <www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-ca/knowledge/publications/759728ff/a-comparative-look-atgood-faith-and-changed-circumstances-hardship-and-more> [perma.cc/5HRY-ANX6].
36. Article 1195 CcF, as translated in John Cartwright et al, “The Law of Contract, the General
Regime of Obligations, and Proof of Obligations: The New Provisions of the Code Civil created by
Ordonnance no 2016-131 of 10 February 2016 Translated into English” (2016) at 18, online (pdf):
<www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/THE-LAW-OF-CONTRACT-2-5-16.pdf>
[perma.cc/567LU6VU].
37. “Force Majeure and Imprévision Under French Law” (26 March 2020), online: Shearman &
Sterling LLP <www.shearman.com/Perspectives/2020/03/Force-Majeure-and-Imprevision-underFrench-Law-COVID-19> [perma.cc/XZ6Z-DWXY].
38. Berger & Behn, supra note 3 at 119.
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and its medical treatment. For example, the Basse-Terre Court of Appeal
dismissed a claim involving the chikungunya epidemic because the illness
was manageable, and the respondent did not invoke an extreme medical
issue sufficient to excuse performance.39 In another case, the Besançon
Court of Appeal refused to assist parties impacted by an amended sanitary
regulation during the H1N1 epidemic.40 This case preceded Article 1195’s
adoption; however, the Court’s reasoning regarding unforeseeability is
instructive. It emphasized that the epidemic had been widely announced;
therefore, the regulation’s amendment could not be said to be unforeseeable,
nor could it justify non-performance.41 These cases illustrate that hardship
in France does not lightly allow for deviation from contractual terms.
Second, Article 1195 is rooted in the parties’ autonomous wills: the
parties can only invoke this article if they have not already allocated the
risk.42 For example, the Paris Court of Appeal dismissed a case involving a
loan agreement between a state entity and a bank.43 The state entity entered
into a “swap agreement” with another bank, whereby the interest rate
would be exchanged in foreign currency.44 Following a twofold increase
of the foreign currency’s interest rate, the state entity refused to pay the
balance and argued that it should be revised due to the unpredictable
events that caused the increase.45 The Court held that the state entity could
not rely on Article 1195 because the parties had already allocated the risk
in their contract.46 This indicates the primacy of contractual terms, despite
the flexibility that hardship permits. 47
2. Articles 6.2.1–6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles
UNIDROIT’s conception of hardship is also instructive, given its treatment
by courts and arbitral tribunals.48 The affirmation of pacta sunt servanda
39. CA Basse-Terre, 17 December 2018, No 17/00739.
40. CA Besançon, 8 January 2014, No 12/02291.
41. Ibid.
42. Article 1195 of the CcF, supra note 36.
43. CA Paris, 16 February 2018, No 16/08968.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. The text of this paper only reviews two features that illustrate the value that French courts place
on contractual terms. For example, Article 1195 also requires the parties to continue to perform their
obligations during renegotiations. If they fail to do so, they will be in breach of contract: CA Paris,
April 2017, No 20160760927.
48. Various courts and arbitral tribunals have turned to UNIDROIT for guidance and suggested
that contracting parties can select to be governed by them. UNIDROIT’s conception of hardship is
flexible, given that it does not tie the possible excuse for non-performance to strict impossibility or
“frustration” of purpose. It also allows the parties to preserve the value of the contract and address
the supervening imbalance created by the hardship event. For more information, see: IBA Working
Group on the Practice of the UNIDROIT Principles 2016, “Perspectives in Practice of the UNIDROIT
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in Article 6.2.1 is subject to the exception of hardship when a supervening
event “fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract.”49 Hardship
will be present if the disadvantaged party can demonstrate that either the
cost of performance has increased or that its value has decreased, and
that (a) the events took place post-formation, (b) the events could not
reasonably have been considered at formation, (c) the events were beyond
the parties’ control, and (d) the disadvantaged party did not expressly
or tacitly assume the risk.50 With regard to the specific language of a
“fundamental” alteration of the contractual equilibrium, UNIDROIT does
not specify any quantitative measures. Rather, the analysis is based on the
circumstances surrounding the contract.51 As the SCC noted in Churchill
Falls, hardship under UNIDROIT cannot be relied upon to “redress a
disequilibrium that harms no one but seems to unduly benefit one party.”52
It is reserved for situations of “true financial peril”53 in which the courts
must “avert the ruin of a party.”54
Principles 2016” (2019) at 4, 38, online (pdf): International Bar Association <www.ibanet.org/
MediaHandler?id=D266F2AF-3E0B-4DC0-AFCE-662E5D49BB7E> [perma.cc/9A3U-CTFS] [IBA
Perspectives].
49. “UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016” (2016) art 6.2.1, online
(pdf):
UNIDROIT
<www.unidroit.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Unidroit-Principles-2016English-bl.pdf> [perma.cc/5WPF-Y6L5] [UNIDROIT Principles].
50. Ibid, art 6.2.2. To rely on hardship under UNIDROIT, the parties must not have assumed the
risk. Article 6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles stipulates that parties who enter into speculative
transactions are deemed to accept a certain degree of risk, regardless of their awareness at the time
of formation. Further, the UNIDROIT Secretariat provides additional guidance about both tacit and
express assumption of risk. For example, with regard to tacit assumption of risk, the Secretariat
gives the hypothetical of an opera singer who accepts to sing in an opera in a foreign country, where
early Covid-19 cases have been reported. She accepts to sing, even though a few days before the
performance, two other singers test positive and must be replaced. Ultimately, the singer is infected
and must quarantine for two weeks. Consequently, she suffers substantial loss of income and cannot
perform in other concerts. Even though the parties’ agreement did not expressly allocate the risk in case
of a supervening event, the singer took the risk when she decided to travel to a Covid-19 “hotspot.” As
such, despite the absence of an express contractual stipulation allocating risk, she would not be entitled
to a remedy under the Principles. For more information, and to read this hypothetical, see: UNIDROIT
Secretariat, Covid-19 Guidance, supra note 1 at para 39. With regard to express assumption of risk, an
Italian case offers a useful example. A municipality contracted with a company for revenue collecting
services. In 2011, the tax system was amended to replace the current municipality tax and the current
methods used to collect taxes was rendered inappropriate and ineffective by the new law. The company
claimed that the municipality breached its contractual obligations when it failed to renegotiate the
contract; however, its claim was dismissed. Specifically referring to UNIDROIT, the tribunal based its
finding on the renegotiation clause that the parties had agreed upon at the time the contract was formed.
Given the pre-emptive allocation of risk, the company could not rely on the doctrine of hardship. See
Tribunal of Bergamo, Case No 2342/2017, as cited in IBA Perspectives, supra note 48 at 251.
51. UNIDROIT Secretariat, supra note 1 at para 35.
52. Churchill Falls SCC, supra note 2 at para 90.
53. Marie Annik Grégoire, Liberté, responsabilité et utilité: la bonne foi comme instrument de
justice (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2010) at 237, as cited in Churchill Falls SCC, supra note 2 at
para 91.
54. Jean-Louis Baudouin, Pierre-Gabriel Jobin & Nathalie Vézina, Les obligations, 7th ed
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Beyond the significance of the event, the parties must conduct
themselves in good faith throughout renegotiations. This means that the
disadvantaged party must genuinely believe that they are experiencing
hardship. Further, they must not wield hardship as a “purely tactical
manoeuvre” to rewrite their bargain with the benefit of hindsight.55 The
parties must participate in a constructive manner, refrain from obstructing
the process, and provide all necessary information.56 If they fail to reach a
revised bargain, they may request judicial intervention.57 The judge’s role,
however, is not to inject their own sense of justice into the contract, but
rather to impose a “fair distribution of the losses between the parties.”58
If neither solution is appropriate, then a judge may direct the parties to
resume renegotiations or confirm the contract’s present terms.59 Overall,
UNIDROIT’s perception of hardship is informed by good faith. Given that
good faith continues to evolve in Anglo-Canadian contract law, this paper
argues for its development to encompass a similar scheme to accommodate
contractual hardship.
III. Using good faith to open the door to a potential duty to renegotiate
in Canada
Before proposing a test for a potential duty to renegotiate, it is necessary
to review the law pertaining to good faith contractual performance in
Canada and to explain why this doctrine provides an appropriate response.
In its 2018 decision in Churchill Falls, the SCC found that hardship does
not constitute part of Québec civil law; however, in obiter, it sowed the
seeds for recourse in situations involving “true financial peril.”60 Given the
“judicial dialogue”61 across Canada, it is necessary to take a transsystemic
approach to illustrate that there is an area of permissibility and great

(Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2013) at n 446.
55. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 49, art 6.2.3. Article 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles
at Comment 3 stipulates that the disadvantaged party has a duty of good faith to evaluate honestly
whether hardship has truly taken place. This is buttressed by the fact that the request for renegotiations
and the conduct of the parties at renegotiations are subject to good faith, fair dealing, and the duty to
cooperate under Articles 5.1.3 and 1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles.
56. Ibid, art 6.2.3 at Comment 5.
57. Ibid at Comments 6, 7. According to these Comments, there is no specific waiting time before
the parties may resort to the court, given that this decision will hinge on the complexity of the issues
and the dispute’s circumstances.
58. Ibid at Comment 7. Generally, the effect of the adaptation cannot be a better deal than the one
initially concluded as a result of mutual concessions, accommodations, and withdrawals of initial
demands during negotiations.
59. Ibid.
60. Grégoire, supra note 53.
61. Rosalie Jukier, “Good Faith in Contract: A Judicial Dialogue Between Common Law Canada
and Québec” (2019) 1:1 J Commonwealth L 83 [Jukier, “Good Faith”].
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potential growth to address hardship in Anglo-Canadian contract law
through the avenue of good faith (as opposed to other doctrines, such as
that of interpretation, which in any event exceeds the scope of this article).
1. Québec Civil Law
As a limitation on contractual consensualism, good faith forms the
cornerstone of Québec private law obligations.62 An omnipresent principle
that applies from the very birth of the obligation, good faith in Québec
allows judges to temper interpretations of contractual terms and intervene
based on notions of fairness. 63 Good faith originally emanated from Article
1024 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, which Québec courts often used
to modify unambiguously drafted contracts.64 It is now set out in Articles
6, 7, and 1375 of the Civil Code of Québec (the “CCQ”).
Since the CCQ does not define good faith, jurisprudence continues
to colour Québec’s broad and flexible framework of good faith, which
continuously evolves with Québec society’s moral fabric: it is “the
legal equivalent of the moral concept of goodwill, and closely related
to the application of equity”65 and “serves to connect legal principles
with fundamental concepts of fairness.”66 Given that the SCC left the
door open to one day recognize hardship in Churchill Falls, this broad,
flexible, and evolving principle has the potential to protect parties whose
performance is rendered unduly burdensome due to supervening events.
This narrow opening, paired with Québec’s flexible approach to contracts
(as demonstrated by the doctrine of abuse of rights), supports the argument
for a cautiously developed duty to renegotiate in good faith.
a. Good faith and abuse of rights
Good faith includes the doctrine of abuse of rights, which “states essentially
that a person may incur civil liability through a certain act, even though
such act is within the bounds of a legal right.”67According to Professor
62. In Québec, the binding force of contracts is set out in Article 1434 of the CCQ. Exceptions
allow for the derogation from terms, such as good faith and abuse of rights. See Vincent Karim, Les
obligations, vol 1, 5th ed (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2020) at 64 at para 171; Didier Lluelles, “La
révision du contrat en droit québecois” (2006) 36:1 RGD 25.
63. Churchill Falls SCC, supra note 2 at para 103.
64. Rosalie Jukier, “Banque Nationale du Canada v Houle (SCC): Implications of an Expanded
Doctrine of Abuse of Rights in Civilian Contract Law” (1992) 37 McGill LJ 221 at 234 [Jukier,
“Banque Nationale”].
65. Ministère de la Justice, Commentaires du ministre de la Justice, vol. I, Le Code civil du Québec—
Un mouvement de société (1993) at 832, as cited at para 104 of Churchill Falls SCC, supra note 2.
66. Ibid.
67. David Angus, “Abuse of Rights in Contractual Matters in the Province of Québec” (1962) 8:2
McGill LJ 150 at 151. While it exceeds the scope of this paper, the SCC used the doctrine of abuse of
rights in the context of its analysis of the duty of honesty in Callow, supra note 34 to illustrate that a
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Pierre-Gabriel Jobin, “the justification by the courts through contractual
liability to check abuse of rights in contracts is the higher and more general
standard of good faith in contracts.”68 Both abuse of rights and good faith
are instrumental to Québec’s morally infused regime for contractual
behaviour. Abuse of rights, in particular, must strike a delicate balance.
Courts must be wary about undermining the parties’ express contractual
terms on the basis that “equity ought to be the overriding norm.”69
A trilogy of SCC decisions has cemented the roles of good faith and
abuse of rights in Québec, illustrating “a gradual increase of judicial
intervention in the contractual sphere.”70 This trilogy demonstrates Québec
civil law’s move in a direction that values reasonable and fair contractual
behaviour, which parallels Anglo-Canadian contract law’s trajectory.
Consequently, it is valuable to briefly review two of these three decisions.71
First, National Bank v Soucisse et al involved a contract of suretyship
that stipulated that the guarantor’s heirs would pay his debts after his
death.72 This contract, while revocable, was expressly binding on his
heirs.73 Upon the guarantor’s death, the Bank tried to collect the debts
from his heirs.74 The legal issue was whether the heirs should be forced to
pay these debts, even though they had never been told about the guarantee
or its revocable nature.75 According to the SCC, the Bank had an implied
obligation to inform the heirs of the agreement and its revocable nature
before demanding payment.76 Consequently, the SCC prevented the Bank
from collecting the debt. Soucisse illustrates the flexibility that abuse of
rights allows judges: as Professor Jukier has observed, the obligation to
inform was not stipulated in the contract, nor could it be gleaned through
contractual interpretation principles.77
Second, in Houle v Canadian National Bank, the Bank and a family
company contracted for a commercial demand loan.78 When the Bank
condominium corporation’s exercise of a termination clause breached its duty of honesty.
68. Pierre-Gabriel Jobin, “L’abus de droit contractuel depuis 1980” in Congrès annuel du Barreau
du Québec (Montréal: Service de la formation permanente Barreau du Québec, 1990) 127 at 133.
69. Jukier, “Banque Nationale,” supra note 64 at 233.
70. Ibid.
71. The third case in the trilogy is Bank of Montréal v Bail Ltée, [1992] 2 SCR 554, 93 DLR (4th)
490. This case extended good faith’s application to pre-contractual conduct, it is thus tangential to this
paper’s thesis, which focuses on supervening events following formation.
72. National Bank v Soucisse et al, [1981] 2 SCR 339, 15 ACWS (2d) 309 [Soucisse cited to SCR].
73. Ibid at 341.
74. Ibid at 343.
75. Ibid at 341.
76. Ibid at 357.
77. Jukier, “Banque Nationale,” supra note 64 at 233.
78. Houle v Canadian National Bank, [1990] 3 SCR 122, 74 DLR (4th) 577 [Houle cited to SCR].
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demanded repayment without notice—as allowed under the contract—the
borrower suffered significant financial loss.79 As such, the SCC assessed
the manner in which the Bank exercised its express contractual right.80 In
finding that the Bank’s decision to recall the loan without reasonable notice
was in breach of good faith, the SCC went beyond punishing intentional
bad faith behaviour. Rather, it extended liability for the unreasonable
exercise of the right.81 Although Houle led the law in a more equitable
direction, it has been criticized for effectively converting a demand loan
into one that requires reasonable notice.82 As such, Houle highlights a fear
that persists across Canada: that judges will use equitable doctrines to
transform contractual bargains for the sake of fairness.
The facts in Houle can be contrasted with the English case of Çukurova
Finance Int Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd, which involved a high-interest
loan secured by shares of a Turkish company.83 Under this contract, certain
events of default allowed the lender to demand immediate repayment of
the loan, and on default of immediate repayment, the company’s shares.84
When an event of default occurred, the lender demanded payment; however,
it rejected the borrower’s payment because it was rendered too late.85 The
Privy Council rejected the borrower’s arguments on good faith, given that
the lender had a contractual right to advance the date of repayment—and
in these circumstances, seize its security—in an event of default.86 While
this approach differed from Québec civil law’s, Çukurova demonstrates the
tension between honouring contractual certainty and the desire for fairness
in situations concerning the exercise of contractual rights.87 According to
Professor Stephen Waddams, the approach in Çukurova “might be said,
from an equitable perspective, to allow form to prevail over substance.”88
This is the exact theoretical tightrope that this paper walks.
At this juncture, it is necessary to note the parallels between abuse
of rights and the common law duty to exercise a contractual discretion
in good faith (which will be further developed below). In Québec, this
link is demonstrated by judicial findings that parties attempting to exercise
seemingly unfettered rights can be liable for abuse of rights (even when
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Ibid at 130-132.
Ibid at 135.
Ibid at 150.
Jukier, “Banque Nationale,” supra note 64 at 228, 230-231, 233, 235.
Çukurova Finance Int Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd, [2013] UKPC 2 [Çukurova].
Ibid at paras 7, 13, 74-76.
Ibid at para 7.
Ibid at para 74.
Waddams, “Good Faith,” supra note 6 at 35 at para 3.18.
Ibid at 33 at para 3.13.

Good Faith’s Trajectory in Anglo-Canadian Contract Law
Post-Wastech and the Potential for a Duty to Renegotiate

15

acting within the four corners of the agreement).89 Both concepts, rooted
in the morally infused doctrine of good faith, concern the extent to which
judges can intervene and limit the parties’ ability to exercise the rights for
which they bargained. Regardless of the label, these concepts effectively
allow judges to subordinate the contract’s terms to equitable concerns.
Some courts have tempered this development through their view that
good faith should not “permit a judge to exercise moral control over the
performance of a contract to the point of adding an element of distributive
justice into contractual relationships.”90 This concern can be alleviated,
however, by grounding the analysis in the parties’ intentions as expressed
in the contract. In any case, the tension between loyalty to the contract’s
terms and notions of fairness can never be fully resolved.91
In relation to this paper’s thesis, denying a counterparty in hardship
the opportunity to renegotiate could be considered “excessive and
unreasonable” in the light of a supervening event, and “therefore contrary
to the requirements of good faith.”92 There is sufficient flexibility in the
law to one day insert the duty to renegotiate “into today’s trend towards a
just and fair approach to rights and obligations.”93 Yet, as Professor Jukier
has indicated, it is ironic that, despite its willingness to “ignore, add to,
vary and rewrite parties’ contracts in the name of equity and good faith,”
Québec civil law remains “wedded to the notion of autonomy of the wills
in other aspects of contract law,” including hardship.94 The following
section attempts to resolve this irony to indicate an opening for hardship
not only in Québec, but also in the rest of Canada.
b. Addressing the SCC’s decision in Churchill Falls Labrador (Corp) v
Hydro-Québec
In Churchill Falls, the SCC rejected hardship in Québec civil law. Churchill
Falls (“CFLCo”) and Hydro-Québec embarked on a 65-year contract for the
construction and operation of a hydro-electric plant.95 At negotiations, the
parties decided against including a formula to adjust to market changes.96
After the contract was formed, the price of hydroelectricity skyrocketed.97

89. Jukier, “Banque Nationale,” supra note 64 at 235.
90. Jukier, “Good Faith,” supra note 61.
91. Mindy Chen-Wishart, “Humble Good Faith 3x4” (12 March 2021), online (video): Oxford Law
Alumni: Meet the Dean <www.law.ox.ac.uk/node/26432> [perma.cc/9B8Y-VLLZ].
92. Art 7 CCQ.
93. Houle, supra note 78 at 145.
94. Jukier, “Banque Nationale,” supra note 64 at 237.
95. Churchill Falls SCC, supra note 2 at para 1.
96. Ibid at para 14.
97. Ibid at para 17.
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Consequently, Hydro-Québec made an enormous profit.98 Although its
profits were disproportionate to Hydro-Québec’s, CFLCo continued to
reap the benefits for which it contracted (including a plant worth over
$20 billion).99 CFLCo claimed that Hydro-Québec was legally required—
according to equity and good faith—to renegotiate the contract.100
The lower courts found that CFLCo’s case could not support
renegotiation or contractual revision.101 Explicitly referring to UNIDROIT,
the Québec Court of Appeal found that the two basic requirements of
hardship were not met.102 First, the changed market price of hydroelectricity
did not increase the cost of CFLCo’s performance, nor did it reduce the
value of Hydro-Québec’s. Second, the change was a “known unknown.”103
The parties knew that the price of hydroelectricity fluctuated, yet they
proceeded without an adjustment mechanism, “which confirms that the
contract was to apply regardless of the magnitude of the fluctuations.”104
Hydro-Québec was also successful in a 7:1 decision at the SCC.
Writing for the majority, Gascon J found that CFLCo’s claim had no basis in
Québec civil law.105 A notable factor in this decision was that the legislator
had explicitly rejected hardship during the CCQ’s reform.106 As Professor
Waddams has written, however, “leaving the matter to legislation is not a
satisfactory response.”107 This is insufficient to forever close the door to
hardship in Québec.
Beyond the legislative rejection, the SCC emphasized that HydroQuébec did not have a duty to renegotiate the contract when the unforeseen
market changes led it to reap significant profits.108 While good faith allows
courts to intervene and ensure that parties execute their obligations equitably,
the majority maintained that this could not extend to redistributing the
profits for which the parties initially bargained—especially when CFLCo
did not face financial peril.109 Nonetheless, the majority did not completely
close the door to hardship. In “true” cases of hardship, the SCC wrote that
98. Ibid at paras 17-18.
99. Ibid at para 2.
100. Ibid at para 40.
101. Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Ltd c Hydro-Québec, 2014 QCCS 3590 at paras 542,
551 [Churchill FallsQCCS]; Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Ltd c Hydro-Québec, 2016
QCCA 1229 at para 62 [Churchill Falls QCCA].
102. Churchill Falls QCCA, supra note 101 at para 152.
103. Churchill Falls QCCS, supra note 101 at paras 374-376; Ibid at para 46.
104. Churchill Falls SCC, supra note 2 at para 80.
105. Ibid at para 6.
106. Ibid at para 93.
107. Waddams, “Sanctity of Contracts,” supra note 7 at 200.
108. Churchill Falls SCC, supra note 2 at para 105.
109. Ibid at para 91.
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a party refusing to exhibit reasonable flexibility regarding the other party’s
obligations could be in breach of good faith:
What constitutes unreasonable conduct contrary to the duty of good faith
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. For example, in a situation
of “hardship” that corresponds to the description of that concept set out
in the UNIDROIT Principles, the conduct of the contracting party who
benefits from the change in circumstances cannot be disregarded and
must be assessed.110

As such, there is potential for good faith to allow for renegotiations in cases
where, despite the possibility of continued performance, the parties face
financial ruin due to an unforeseeable event. This development will depend
on the passage of a case with the appropriate factual matrix. This article
contends that the outcome in Churchill Falls might have been different
if the company faced bankruptcy because of a completely unforeseeable
event like Covid-19 (which could not have been predicted in 1969).
2. Anglo-Canadian Common Law
Although Churchill Falls involved Québec civil law, its message is
pertinent to Anglo-Canadian contract law because Cromwell J (as he then
was) looked to Québec when he opened the door to good faith in AngloCanadian contract law in Bhasin v Hrynew.111 Despite warnings that “the
courts must be wary of rescuing parties from deals which turn out to be
unfavourable,”112 the cautious development of this principle would allow
for fairness when changed circumstances render performance excessively
onerous.
a. Good faith’s evolution: from “contortion and subterfuge”113 to
organizing principle
Good faith in Anglo-Canadian contract law has a complex history. Prior
to the seminal case of Bhasin, this doctrine developed in a “piecemeal”114
manner. Good faith generally applied in scenarios in which one party had
the “power to unilaterally defeat the other’s contractual objectives.”115

110. Ibid at para 113.
111. Bhasin, supra note 5 at paras 32, 41-42, 82-83, 85. One of Cromwell J’s objectives was to bring
Anglo-Canadian contract law more in line with its key trading partners. In particular, he noted that
“experience in Quebec and the United States shows that even very broad conceptions of the duty of
good faith have not impeded contractual activity or contractual stability:” (ibid at para 85).
112. IFP Technologies (Canada) Inc v EnCana Midstream and Marketing, 2017 ABCA 157 at para
355 [IFP Technologies].
113. Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Amendment of the Law of Contract (1987) at 169.
114. Bhasin, supra note 5 at para 32.
115. Bhasin, 2014 SCC 71 (Factum of the Appellant at para 38) [Bhasin FOA].
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As such, the courts often rationalized their application of good faith by
appealing to notions of fairness.116
In Bhasin, the SCC attempted to settle the law pertaining to good
faith. Before delving into any analysis, it is useful to set out the facts of
this seminal case. Mr. Bhasin worked as an enrollment director for CanAm, which marketed education savings plans to investors.117 Mr. Bhasin
had a three-year contract with Can-Am, which was set to automatically
renew at the end of the three-year term unless one of the parties provided
six months’ written notice of termination.118 Mr. Hrynew and Mr. Bhasin
were competitors, and the former wanted to capture his lucrative market
and actively encouraged Can-Am to merge their agencies (even though
Mr. Bhasin had already refused to do so).119 When Mr. Hrynew was
appointed the provincial trading officer for Can-Am, he was allowed to
conduct audits of Can-Am’s enrollment directors, including Mr. Bhasin.120
Mr. Bhasin objected to having Mr. Hrynew review his confidential
business records. Meanwhile, Can-Am had been planning to restructure
its agencies, including Mr. Bhasin’s (without his knowledge). Can-Am
repeatedly misled Mr. Bhasin regarding this matter and, when he directly
asked whether the merger would proceed, it responded equivocally.121
When Mr. Bhasin continuously refused to allow Mr. Hrynew to audit his
records, Can-Am gave him notice of non-renewal under the contract. As a
result, at the expiry of the contract’s term, Mr. Bhasin lost the value in his
business in his assembled workforce and Mr. Hrynew’s agency solicited
most of his sales agents.122 Mr. Bhasin sued Can-Am and Mr. Hrynew.
At first instance, the trial judge found in favour of Mr. Bhasin; however,
the Court of Appeal for Alberta allowed the appeal and dismissed Mr.
Bhasin’s lawsuit.123
Despite the prior categorization of good faith’s application according
to certain kinds of relationships, the Supreme Court found in favour of
Mr. Bhasin. In particular, the Supreme Court incrementally advanced the
common law of contract to allow for a fair outcome in this case:
116. See McCamus, supra note 8 at 839; CivicLife Inc v Canada (Attorney General) (2006), 149
ACWS (3d) 417, 215 OAC 43 (Ont CA) [CivicLife]; Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd, [1997]
3 SCR 701, 152 DLR (4th) 1; Mesa Operating Limited Partnership v Amoco Canada Resources Ltd
(1994), 19 Alta LR (3d) 38, 149 AR 187 (CA) [Mesa cited to Alta LR].
117. Bhasin, supra note 5 at para 2-3.
118. Ibid at para 6.
119. Ibid at para 9.
120. Ibid at para 10.
121. Ibid at para 12.
122. Ibid at para 13.
123. Ibid at paras 15-16.
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In my view, it is time to take two incremental steps in order to make the
common law less unsettled and piecemeal, more coherent and more just.
The first step is to acknowledge that good faith contractual performance
is a general organizing principle of the common law of contract which
underpins and informs the various rules in which the common law, in
various situations and types of relationships, recognizes obligations of
good faith contractual performance. The second is to recognize as a
further manifestation of this organizing principle of good faith, that there
is a common law duty which applies to all contracts to act honestly in the
performance of contractual obligations [emphasis added].124

While this “modest, incremental step”125 has been criticized, the author
supports its underlying premise of deterring poor contracting behaviour in
which the parties may hide behind the contract’s express terms (as the
Appellant attempted to do in Callow close to a decade later).
Key to the Bhasin decision is that the SCC recognized good faith as
a general, organizing principle that underpins all contracts.126 Cromwell
J defined the principle as “simply that parties generally must perform
their contractual duties honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or
arbitrarily.”127 This umbrella-like concept now encompasses four specific
duties (three of which applied prior to Bhasin): (a) the duty of honest
performance,128 (b) the duty of cooperation,129 (c) the duty to exercise
a contractual discretion in good faith,130 and (d) the duty not to evade
contractual obligations.131 That said, this list of duties is not exhaustive. In
particular, Cromwell J noted in Bhasin that:
124. Ibid at para 33.
125. Ibid at para 73.
126. Ibid at para 33.
127. Ibid at para 63.
128. Cromwell J established the duty of honest performance, “which requires the parties to be honest
with each other in relation to the performance of their contractual obligations,” as one of the two
incremental steps taken in Bhasin (ibid at para 93). This specific duty was recently reviewed in Callow,
supra note 34; however, questions remain as to the scope of this duty and the boundaries between it
and a potential duty to disclose.
129. Cromwell J described this duty as a situation involving “contracts requiring the cooperation of
the parties to achieve the objects of the contract:” Bhasin, supra note 5 at para 49. See also Dynamic
Transport Ltd v OK Detailing Ltd, [1978] 2 SCR 1072, 85 DLR (3d) 19; Arton Holdings Ltd et al v
Gateway Realty Ltd (1991), 106 NSR (2d) 180, [1991] NSJ No 362 (NSSC (TD)); CivicLife, supra
note 116.
130. The exercise of a discretion will be further discussed below, given its relevance to this paper’s
thesis. This duty provides that, where a party to a contract holds a discretionary power under the
contract, they must exercise it reasonably. Specifically, they ought to exercise it in a manner connected
to the purpose of the contract’s grant of discretion. See e.g. Mitsui & Co (Canada) Ltd v Royal Bank of
Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 187, 123 DLR (4th) 449 [Mitsui]; Wastech Services Ltd v Greater Vancouver
Sewerage and Drainage District, 2021 SCC 7 [Wastech].
131. This duty arises “where a contractual power is used to evade a contractual duty” (Bhasin, supra
note 5 at para 51). See also Mason v Freedman, [1958] SCR 483, 14 DLR (2d) 529.
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…[T]his list is not closed. The application of the organizing principle
of good faith to particular situations should be developed where the
existing law is found to be wanting and where the development may
occur incrementally in a way that is consistent with the structure of
the common law of contract and gives due weight to the importance of
private ordering and certainty in commercial affairs.132

On the whole, then, although Bhasin attempted to clarify the law,
questions remain about good faith’s scope and application, not to mention
whether it should be analyzed subjectively or objectively.133 While these
questions are of great value to Anglo-Canadian contract law, they exceed
the scope of this paper, which effectively argues that the courts should add
to this list a specific duty to renegotiate in situations of hardship.
In concrete terms, Bhasin introduced three steps that Anglo-Canadian
courts must follow in disputes involving allegations of lack of good
faith. First, when faced with an alleged breach of one of the specific
manifestations of good faith, the courts must identify whether the claim
falls within any of the existing manifestations listed above. Second, if the
claim does not fit within any of these manifestations, the courts must assess
whether the situation before them justifies the creation of a new duty as
a specific instantiation of the general organizing principle of good faith.
Third, once the courts have determined that it is appropriate to develop a
new duty, they should identify the content of the new duty in question by
looking to the general organizing principle for guidance.
Applied to the framework of this article, the current manifestations
of good faith—namely, the duty of honesty, the duty of cooperation, the
duty to exercise a contractual discretion in good faith, and the duty not to
evade contractual obligations—do not serve to assist contracting parties
experiencing hardship. Parties faced with hardship do not find themselves
in such a situation because of their lack of honesty in performing their
132. Bhasin, supra note 5 at para 66.
133. Bhasin can be said to reflect Québec civil law’s notion of good faith, given that the SCC looked
beyond the parties’ objective intentions by deciding in favour of Bhasin (this is the author’s own
interpretation of the decision). Numerous scholars have commented on the disconnect between
the objective and the subjective in Bhasin. For example, Professor Waddams has noted that “it is a
little surprising that the court should go to such lengths to establish a principle of good faith only to
declare that the motives of the parties are irrelevant” (Waddams, “Good Faith,” supra note 6 at 41).
Traditionally, the common law of contract has remained loyal to contractual interpretation based on
the parties’ objective intentions. Lord Hoffman opined that “interpretation according to subjective
intent is a logical contradiction:” Lord Hoffman, “The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and Meanings”
(1997) 114:4 SALJ 656 at 661. Anglo-Canadian contract law has illustrated its loyalty to its English
roots in this sense: Eli Lilly & Co v Novopharm Ltd, [1998] 2 SCR 129 at para 54, 161 DLR (4th) 1.
Québec has recognized this tension and recognizes both a subjective and objective element of good
faith: Francois Gendron, L’interpretation des contrats, 2nd ed (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2016) at
76.
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contractual obligations, but rather due to outside circumstances outside
of their control. The duty to cooperate requires “the cooperation of the
parties to achieve the objects of the contract,”134 making it unlikely that
this duty could save parties in situations of hardship (especially seeing
that the object of the contract, not to mention the entire contract itself, has
been thrown off-kilter due to extenuating circumstances). The duty not
to evade a contractual duty also does not apply in such situations, seeing
that situations of hardship are also triggered by outside circumstances, as
opposed to the parties’ attempts to evade their duties. Finally, the duty to
exercise a discretion in good faith does not apply either; however, this
article briefly discusses it next, given its relevance to this article’s point.
In relation to this article’s central thesis, a broad canvassing of the
general organizing principle shows that the duty to renegotiate would
entail an incremental addition to the current list of manifesting duties and
allow good faith to fill the void left by the doctrine of frustration. It would
be assessed in a similar manner as the concepts of abuse of rights and the
duty to exercise a discretion in good faith, namely as a limit to the parties’
right to continue under the contract as originally planned. The remainder
of this article justifies the creation of a potential duty to renegotiate as a
specific manifestation of the general organizing principle of good faith and
identifies its context.
b. The duty to exercise a discretion in good faith
It is useful to discuss the duty to exercise a discretion in good faith,
given the judicial emphasis on reasonableness when deciding whether to
limit a seemingly unfettered contractual right. This duty was rooted in
reasonableness long before Wastech Services Ltd v Greater Vancouver
Sewerage and Drainage District.135 For example, in Greenberg v Meffert
et al, even though the disbursement of a real estate commission was
technically at the company’s discretion, the Court of Appeal for Ontario
found that the defendant had a duty to act reasonably and exercise its
discretion honestly and in good faith:
In any given transaction, the category into which such a provision falls
will depend upon the intention of the parties as disclosed by their contract.
In the absence of explicit language or a clear indication from the tenor of
the contract or the nature of the subject-matter, the tendency of the cases
134. Bhasin, supra note 5 at para 49.
135. Wastech, supra note 130. The seminal case in this line of precedent is Mitsui, supra note 130.
See also Greenberg v Meffert et al (1985), 18 DLR (4th) 548, 50 OR (2d) 755 (Ont CA) [Greenberg
cited to DLR]; Kaban Resources Inc v Goldcorp Inc, 2020 BCSC 1307; Alectra Utilities Corporation
v Solar Power Network Inc, 2018 ONSC 4926.
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is to require the discretion […] to be reasonable…Apart altogether from
the question of reasonableness, a discretion must be exercised honestly
and in good faith…The clause in issue…ought not to be construed so
as to shield the company’s improper exercise of discretion from any
review.136

Greenberg was part of a line of precedent for applying a standard of
reasonableness, based on the purpose of the contract, to the exercise of
a discretionary right.137 Even where a party adheres to the contract, the
unreasonable exercise of a right will violate the principle of good faith.138
Mesa offers another example, given that this dispute arose from the
defendant’s decision to pool its properties for royalty payments in adherence
with the agreement of sale.139 The exercise of this right effectively reduced
the plaintiff’s royalties.140 At the Alberta Court of Appeal, Kerans J did not
explicitly appeal to good faith, which was “not an obvious part”141 of the
law at the time. Rather, he framed his reasoning in the following terms:
The rule that governs here can, therefore, be expressed much more
narrowly than to speak of good faith, although I suspect it is in reality
the sort of thing some judges have in mind when they speak of good
faith. As the trial judge said, a party cannot exercise a power granted in
a contract in a way that ‘substantially nullifies the contractual objectives
or causes significant harm to the other contrary to the original purposes
or expectations of the parties.’142

Kerans J’s acknowledgment of the need to limit parties’ exercise of
discretionary rights can be said to be in the same “spirit” as good faith.
A 19th Century English case, Blisset v Daniel, also illustrates the
limitation of contractual rights to ensure their reasonable exercise, in
line with the contract’s purpose. The court held that the power to expel
a partner in articles of partnership had to be exercised in good faith and
in accordance with the “truth and honour”143 of the contract. The court’s
reasoning paralleled the values underlying the exercise of a discretionary

136. Greenberg, supra note 135 at para 19.
137. Ibid at para 22.
138. Ibid at para 23.
139. Mesa, supra note 116 at para 6.
140. Ibid at para 3.
141. Ibid at para 16.
142. Ibid at para 22.
143. Blisset v Daniel, [1853] 10 Hare 493 at 403, as cited by Nathaniel Lindley, A Treatise On The
Law of Partnership, 5th ed asst by William C Gull & Walter B Lindley, eds (Chicago: Callaghan and
Company, 1888) vol 1 at 477.
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right, abuse of rights, and good faith. As Lord Hoffman observed in O’Neill
v Phillips, “these are all different ways of doing the same thing.”144
Both the duty to exercise a discretionary right and the proposed duty
to renegotiate are founded on the reasoning that the parties’ intentions as
expressed in the contract may be overridden by a common thread (that is,
good faith). As such, it is necessary to briefly discuss the recent Wastech
decision, which illustrates the SCC’s current tenor in this area of the law.
c. Wastech: another incremental step
Wastech was the SCC’s most recent pronouncement on the duty to exercise
a discretion in good faith. Wastech concerned a long-term relational
contract between a waste management company (Wastech) and the
District of Vancouver (“Metro”).145 When Metro exercised its contractual
discretion to reallocate waste,146 Wastech failed to meet its target operating
ratio under the contract.147 Wastech instituted arbitral proceedings on the
basis that Metro’s exercise of discretion made it impossible for it to earn
the level of profit for which it bargained.148
The arbitrator found that Metro’s reallocation of waste was honest
and reasonable, but that it failed to exercise its discretionary right with
appropriate regard for Wastech’s legitimate expectations. Thus, Metro’s
actions constituted a breach of good faith.149 In its decision (which was
upheld by the British Columbia Court of Appeal),150 the British Columbia
Supreme Court set aside the award and warned against using Bhasin to
rewrite the parties’ bargain:
The arbitrator attempted to do what is fair, not as grounded in the
Comprehensive Agreement, but in a more general sense. Bhasin
is not authority for the proposition that contracts may be adjusted
to accommodate situations where one party regrets the contract in

144. O’Neill v Phillips, [1999] 1 WLR 1092 at 1101, [1999] 2 All ER 961, Hoffmann LJ (HL (Eng)).
He, continued, however, that “on the contrary, a new and unfamiliar approach could only cause
uncertainty” (ibid). He cited, with approval, Parker J in In re Astec (BSR) Plc, [1998] 2 BCLC 556:
“to give rise to an equitable constraint based on ‘legitimate expectation’ what is required is a personal
relationship or personal dealings of some kind between the party seeking to exercise the legal right
and the party seeking to restrain such exercise, such as will affect the conscience of the former” (ibid
at 588).
145. Wastech, supra note 130 at paras 1-7.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid at para 17.
148. Ibid at para 18. In particular, Wastech claimed $2, 888, 162 in compensatory damages,
representing the additional sums that it would have earned in 2011 if it had had the opportunity to
achieve its target operating ratio.
149. DCA-1560 (2015), BCICAC at para 28 (Arbitrator: Gerald W Ghikas).
150. Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District v Wastech Services Ltd, 2019 BCCA 66.
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hindsight.151

This comment reflects the deep-seated judicial concern about undermining
contractual terms based on general notions of fairness. The question of
having “appropriate regard”152 for one’s counterparty is also a challenging
element of this duty, and relevant to the proposed duty to renegotiate: to
what extent should a party insist on their own rights under a contract when
their counterparty experiences hardship? There is no clear answer, but
Wastech (while it discussed a different duty) suggests that the determination
could be grounded in the reasonableness of the exercise, looking to the
circumstances surrounding the contract and its purpose.153
In Wastech, Kasirer J, writing for the majority, found that Metro’s
exercise of discretion was reasonable (and, therefore, in good faith).154
While it disadvantaged Wastech, the contract did not guarantee a given
volume of waste to be allocated annually.155 Reading the contract as
a whole, its purpose was “to allow Metro the flexibility necessary to
maximize efficiency and minimize costs of the operation.”156 Given that
Metro’s exercise was consonant with its purpose, it was reasonable and in
good faith.157
Brown and Rowe JJ’s concurrence is noteworthy, given their
disagreement with the notion that courts must form a “broad view of
the purposes of the venture to which the contract gives effect.”158 They
perceived this invocation as a suggestion that judges must use their
discretion, even where the parties choose for it to be unfettered.159 Such
an approach would undermine freedom of contract and distort the parties’
bargain by imposing constraints to which they did not agree.160 Brown and
Rowe JJ opined that, where a contract discloses a clear intention to grant
a discretion that can be exercised for any purpose, then the courts must
give it effect.161 Fundamental to their reasoning was the primacy of the
contract’s text.162 This is relevant to this paper’s thesis: the parties can only
151. Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District v Wastech Services Ltd, 2018 BCSC 605 at
para 63.
152. Wastech, supra note 130 at para 24.
153. Ibid at para 63.
154. Ibid at para 113.
155. Ibid at paras 97-107.
156. Ibid at para 99.
157. Ibid at para 113.
158. Ibid at paras 72, 132.
159. Ibid at para 107.
160. Ibid at para 132.
161. Ibid at para 133.
162. Ibid at para 132.
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derogate from the contract’s text in narrow circumstances under the CCF
and UNIDROIT, and only if they have not already assumed the risk. As
will be discussed below, the analysis for the proposed duty to renegotiate,
while informed by good faith and reasonableness, should be grounded in
the contract’s terms (in accordance with the concurrence’s stance).
Overall, the SCC’s decision in Wastech confirms that a party’s
discretionary power does not give them the right to do whatever they please.
Conversely, the parties that do not hold the discretionary right cannot
retrospectively ask judges to force their counterparties to now subvert their
interests. Doing so would effectively recalibrate the contractual equilibrium
in a manner that the parties failed to do at the negotiating stage. As Kasirer
J remarked, the parties’ only necessary loyalty is to “the bargain”163 in
exercising their discretion. Judges can only “intervene where the exercise
of the power is arbitrary or capricious in light of its purpose as set by the
parties,”164 rather than to provide them with benefits for which they never
bargained. Accordingly, and in relation to the thesis, judges should not
lightly derogate from the parties’ agreement to revise their terms following
changed circumstances. Rather, absent an unforeseeable, supervening
event post-formation, judges should not be permitted to intervene.
Wastech demonstrates that Anglo-Canadian contract law’s approach
increasingly views contractual endeavours as cooperative and mutually
beneficial undertakings, rather than mere economic vehicles of purely
self-interested actors. Still, questions remain about the exact scope and
applicability of the duty and how judges should ascertain the contract’s
purpose.165 In particular, it remains unclear the extent to which good faith
will protect contracting parties’ legitimate expectations, as opposed to the
explicit terms of the contract.166 This could complicate the imposition of
the proposed duty to renegotiate in good faith.
3. The proposed duty to renegotiate
This paper suggests that the organizing principle of good faith should be
judicially developed to encompass a specific manifestation that requires
the parties to renegotiate in the event of contractual hardship. This duty
would be triggered where (i) a supervening event rendered performance
excessively onerous, and (ii) the parties did not allocate the risk if such an
event were to occur. Each will be discussed below, in addition to (iii) the
163. Ibid at para 107.
164. Ibid at para 71.
165. See generally Daniele Bertolini, “Toward a Framework to Define the Outer Boundaries of Good
Faith in Contractual Performance” (2021) 58:3 Alta L Rev 573.
166. Ibid at 620.

26 The Dalhousie Law Journal

conduct at renegotiations and (iv) judicial intervention. While this paper
advocates for the incremental expansion of good faith, it does not argue
that this principle should undermine contracting parties’ ability to rely on
the contract’s express terms. Such a derogation should only take place
where, similar to the concepts of abuse of rights and the duty to exercise a
discretion in good faith, the insistence on that right becomes unreasonable
in relation to the contract’s purpose and the changed circumstances.
a. The supervening event must render performance excessively onerous
The proposed duty to renegotiate in good faith would only be triggered in
narrow circumstances. This duty would be restricted to situations of true
hardship, in the sense of “true financial peril,”167 where the supervening
event rendered the parties’ obligations excessively onerous. This opening
for redress in situations of hardship would be broader than Anglo-Canadian
contract law’s current stance; however, it would not be so malleable as to
undermine the contract’s express terms at any turn of events. This proposal
is in line with Gascon J’s reasoning in Churchill Falls, which recognized
the need for equity and fairness but warned that these concepts should
not be “detached from the will of the parties and their common intention
as revealed in and established by a thorough analysis of the whole of the
relevant evidence.”168 The proposed duty to renegotiate should not be used
to disrupt the contractual equilibrium unless absolutely necessary. In other
words, it should not become a tool for “charity or distributive justice.”169
b. The parties must not have pre-emptively allocated the risk
To alleviate concerns that the proposed duty might be incompatible with
the central tenets of contractual stability and freedom of contract, this
paper suggests that the proposed duty only be triggered where the parties
failed to pre-emptively allocate the risk. If the parties foresaw the risk and
addressed it at the drafting stage, then requiring them to renegotiate—after
they already turned their minds to the possibility—would undermine the
contract’s terms and threaten contractual stability. It would also undercut
the very purpose of the initial negotiations. The same would be true if
the parties discussed the likelihood of the event at negotiations, and
purposely decided not to pre-emptively allocate the risk. This was the case
in Churchill Falls and Wastech, where the SCC was clear that the parties
should not be able to seek rights, ex ante, for which they specifically did

167. Grégoire, supra note 53.
168. Churchill Falls SCC, supra note 2 at para 109.
169. Ibid at para 107.
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not bargain.170 While the use of evidence from negotiations is an important
legal question, it exceeds the scope of this paper.171
In a similar vein, this paper suggests that the parties should be able to
contract out of the proposed duty to renegotiate. This aspect of the duty is
likely to be controversial, given that the operation of good faith in relation
to the parties’ intentions has caused disagreement at the SCC. Even within
the unanimous decision in Bhasin, Cromwell J first stated that good faith
“operates irrespective of the intentions of the parties,”172 yet, at another
passage, that “any modification of the duty of honest performance would
need to be in express terms.”173 Recent SCC judgments have perpetuated
confusion about whether good faith can be excluded by clear contractual
language. For example, in Wastech, Kasirer J stated that the principle of
good faith (and its specific manifestations) should apply irrespective of the
parties’ intentions.174 On the other hand, Brown and Rowe JJ argued that
the application of such duties should be grounded in the contract’s terms:
The purpose of a discretion is always defined by the parties’ intentions,
as revealed by the contract. It follows that, where a contract discloses
a clear intention to grant a discretion that can be exercised for any
purpose, courts, operating within their proper role, must give effect to
that intention. With careful drafting, parties can largely immunize the
exercise of discretion from review on this basis… In either instance,
their intention should be given effect and not subverted.175

Although Wastech concerned discretionary rights, these comments are
pertinent to the proposed duty to renegotiate. Not only would it constitute
another specific manifestation of the organizing principle, but it would
also raise questions about the extent to which judges should intervene
in contracts to ensure fairness. If the parties explicitly chose to preclude

170. Churchill Falls SCC, supra note 2 at paras 107, 131; Wastech, supra note 130 at paras 101-107.
171. Although evidence of negotiations can be useful for judges to objectively assess the circumstances
surrounding the contract, this could have a chilling effect on the parties’ participation in negotiations.
Generally, evidence of pre-contractual negotiations will not be accepted. In IFP Technologies, the
Alberta Court of Appeal explained that evidence of the contract’s surrounding circumstances and
evidence of the parties’ pre-contractual negotiations can overlap; however, evidence of the parties’
subjective intentions will always be inadmissible (supra note 112 at paras 58, 79-87). See also Geoff
R Hall, Canadian Contractual Interpretation Law, 3rd ed (Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 2016) at 3.3.1;
Waddams, “Sanctity of Contract,” supra note 7 at ch 6; Sattva Capital Corp v Creston Moly Corp,
2014 SCC 53 at para 57; Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v Alberta Health Services, 2020
ABCA 4 at para 28.
172. Bhasin, supra note 5 at para 74.
173. Ibid at para 78. Professor Waddams made this observation in Waddams, “Good Faith,” supra
note 6 at 39.
174. Wastech, supra note 130 at paras 91, 94.
175. Ibid at para 133.
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the proposed duty to renegotiate in their contract (or some variation of
it), judges should respect their express terms. Since good faith requires
“consideration of the spirit of the law or the agreement”176 as the parties
have expressed in the contract, this paper takes the stance that the
subordination of contractual terms must be contingent upon the parties’
will as reflected in the contract’s text. As Professor Jobin has observed, “a
court cannot have the power to redraft the agreement, to itself adapt the
agreement to the circumstances; as an outsider to the negotiations and to
the specific context of the parties, it could well impose inappropriate terms
if it were to modify the agreement itself.”177 Of course, this endeavour will
be complicated by ambiguously drafted terms. In such a scenario, judges
may have to take a broader view of the venture to assess the whole of the
factual matrix and to better understand what the parties truly intended.
As discussed above, however, this judicial approach risks subverting the
parties’ intentions to the court’s own ideas of fairness.
c. The parties must behave in good faith at renegotiations
The proposed duty to renegotiate would require the parties to conduct
themselves in good faith throughout renegotiations, similar to the
requirements under UNIDROIT. Concretely, this means that the
disadvantaged party must evidence their genuine belief that they are
experiencing hardship when they request renegotiations.178 Beyond this
belief, both parties must behave reasonably and in good faith during the
renegotiation process.179 Concretely, this means that they must make
efforts to participate in the renegotiations and provide any information
necessary to facilitate the process.180
Beyond good faith efforts to renegotiate, the proposed duty would not
require the parties to successfully reach a new agreement. This remains
loyal to the central tenet of freedom of contract because it allows the
parties to retain control over the process. If they cannot come to a mutually
favourable agreement, forcing them to do so would undermine their
contractual power and it would probably be ineffective. As the proverb
goes, “you can bring a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink.”
176. Baudouin, Jobin & Vézina, supra note 54 at n 127.
177. Gabriel Jobin, “L’imprévision dans la réforme du Code civil et aujourd’hui” in Benoît Moore,
ed, Mélanges JeanLouis Baudouin (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2012) 375 at 387.
178. This requirement is based on Article 19954 of the CCF and Comment 5 of Article 6.2.3 of
the UNIDROIT Principles. (Art 1195 CcF, supra note 36; UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 49, art
6.2.3).
179. This requirement is based on Article 1195 of the CCF and Comment 5 of Article 6.2.3 of the
UNIDROIT Principles.
180. This requirement is based on Comment 5 of Article 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles (supra
note 49, art 6.2.3).
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If an appropriate agreement is not reached, then the parties should
be able to withdraw following reasonable attempts to renegotiate (a
bright line rule would be too rigid). As a practical matter, this possibility
considers the reality that negotiations are time-consuming and expensive.
Protracted renegotiations would not be conducive to lubricating the
wheels of commerce. If the parties were forced to reach a proverbial goal
post to satisfy the proposed duty, then they may merely participate until
that point to check a proverbial box. This would undermine the purpose
of renegotiations, which is to “preserve the contract and the contractual
relationship.”181
d. Judicial intervention should be a tool of last resort
If the renegotiations failed, this paper proposes that the parties should be
entitled to jointly request judicial intervention. As such, any changes made
to the contract would be, in a sense, rooted in both parties’ consent. This
is crucial because “allowing a contract to be modified by a judge at the
request of a single party would conflict seriously with the principles of the
binding force of contracts and freedom of contract.”182
If judges were asked to modify the contract, then the paper suggests
that there should be two components to their legal analysis. First, if
the disadvantaged party claimed that the other side breached their duty
to renegotiate, judges must assess whether the impugned party made
reasonable efforts to renegotiate and conduct themselves in good faith.
If the party insisted on their contractual right in an unreasonable manner,
despite the disadvantaged counterparty’s hardship, then this could indicate
a breach of the duty to renegotiate in good faith.
Second, judges must address the disequilibrium that resulted from
the supervening event. This paper suggests that judges should implement
a frustration-like recourse allowing for partial relief from performance.
Professor Waddams has observed the significance of partial enforcement:
“the underlying objection to full enforcement is not lack of consent to
the transaction as a whole, but the unreasonable consequences that would
flow from enforcing a particular part of the contract.”183 This analysis
should consider what courses of action would be reasonable in the light
of the changed circumstances, remaining loyal to the contract’s purpose
as expressed in its terms: after all, “judicial decision-making is not an
open-ended pursuit of the judge’s personal views of right and wrong.”184
181.
182.
183.
184.
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Such a test would affirm the courts’ inherent power to set boundaries for
the exercise of contractual rights—but only where absolutely necessary.
Another option might be for judges to recalibrate the contractual
equilibrium by making a reasonable modification. This would be useful
where partial enforcement cannot be implemented for practical reasons.
For example, in a long-term construction contract impacted by Covid-19,
judges could assist a contractor facing financial hardship by reasonably
increasing payments from the other side to account for unforeseen
expenses during a key phase of construction. This recalibration—limited
to the terms impacted by the supervening event—would facilitate their
ability to pursue their mutual objectives. Generally, though, judges’ power
to intervene should be exercised cautiously and as a last resort.

Conclusion

As it stands, Anglo-Canadian contract law does not allow parties to
seek recourse when supervening events render contractual performance
exceedingly onerous.185 Given that good faith has the potential to resolve
inconsistencies in the law as a broad and flexible principle, its use as
a residual power may better protect contracting parties impacted by
Covid-19. A corresponding duty to renegotiate would allow the parties to
retain some level of control over their own arrangements while bending
(cautiously) to the need for fairness. Seeing that Covid-19 has disrupted
global economies, the time is ripe to further develop good faith to fill the
gaps created by the doctrine of frustration.

Press, 2018) at 125.
185. Churchill Falls SCC, supra note 2; Berger & Behn, supra note 3.

